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NOTES AND COMMENTS

whether we are still in the formative state in a matter of serious
policy wherein no definite trend has begun to appear. We can say
that the manner in which the Court will treat the next case presenting the same problem is quite unpredictable. Like many questions of
law wherein an active social or political policy is the final arbiter,
the presence or absence of a few facts on either side may be the
deciding factor with little or no real attention given to preceding cases.
It is not contended that federal judges are less qualified than state
judges to decide questions of interpretation and application of state
law. However, it cannot be denied that most of these cases, especially
those where a constitutional question is involved, can travel to the
Supreme Court through the state courts as well as through the federal courts and in doing so will pick up the applicable interpretation
of state law which cannot be doubted to be the state law at least
for that case. This alone appears to be sufficient reason for litigants
to resort to state courts when an uncertain or unsettled question of
state law is inherent in the case, even though federal courts are
equally open to them so far as jurisdiction is concerned.
Although at present it is presumptuous to say that it is the policy
of the Court that state matters would be better litigated in state courts,
the instant case presents an almost too clear example of when a federal
court should refuse to rule on the merits of a case because the matter
would not only be better litigated in the state courts, but because it
is essential to have it litigated there. The Meredith case would seem
to indicate that the Court had withdrawn from its post-Erie attitude
of emphasizing federal noninterference with state laws.
The most effective way at present of avoiding this unnecessary
litigation and burden to both federal and state courts seems to be
with the clients and their lawyers, who, having a choice of either
federal or state courts, should choose the state courts when their litigation involves a doubtful or uncertain application of state law.

JURISDICTION
FUTURE EARNINGS AS BASIS FOR EQUITY JURISDICTION
To compel the support and maintenance of minor children of parties
to a divorce, an equity court ordered sequestration of future salary of
the nonresident husband, who had been served by publication. The
salary was payable by his resident employer, a party to the action.
Later the court ordered that either the husband pay the award decreed
within a specified time or that the amount accumulated by the employer be paid to the plaintiff. Held: affirmed. The decree for maintenance was in rem since (a) a man's labor or right to labor is the
highest form of property,1 (b) the husband's property in his work
was in existence at the time of the sequestration order by analogy to
1.

Massie v. Cessna, 239 Ill. 352, 358, 70 N.E. 564, 565 (1904) (freedom
to contract for assignment of wages); Frorer v. People, 141 Ill.
171, 181, 31 N.E. 395, 396 (1892) (freedom to contract for manner
of payment of wages).
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a trust fund case, 2 and (c) the alternative feature of such a decree
preserves its character as a decree in rem.3 Mowrey v. Mowney,
65 N.E. (2d) 234 (Ill. App. 1946).
A purely personal decree for alimony or maintenance against a
non-resident, who does not appear after constructive notice, is void. 4
But where the nature and situs of the property will support a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, 5 the court, if authorized by statute,
will render such decree against property within the jurisdiction specifically proceeded against.6 Attachment or seizure of the property
at the beginning of or during pendency of the suit is not essential to
jurisdiction. 7
Here the only question is whether the nature of the property8
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

7.

8.

Tuttle v. Gunderson, 254 Ill. App. 552 (1929), cert, dis'm., 341 Il.
36, 173 N.E. 175 (1930).
Cox v. Cox, 192 Ill. App. 286, 295 (1915); Crawford v. Nimmons,
180 Ill. 143, 146, 54 N.E. 209, 210 (1899); Kirby v. Runals, 140 Ill.
289, 297, 29 N.E. 697, 699 (1892).
Smith v. Smith, 74 Vt. 20, 51 Atl. 1060, 1061 (1901); Hicks v.
Hicks, 193 Ga. 446, 447, 18 S.E. (2d) 754, 755 (1942); Proctor v.
Proctor, 215 Ill. 275, 277, 74 N.E. 145, 146 (1905).
"The proceeding in rem can be correctly and adequately understood
only if it be realized that it is essentially an anonymous proceeding,
being aimed to reach the interest of the true owner (or owners)
of the property whoever he may be. The proceeding quasi in rem is,
on the other hand, aimed to reach only the interest of a named
party." Hohfeld, "Fundamental Legal Conceptions" (1923) 110,
n. 103.
Wilson v. Smart, 324 Ill. 276, 281, 155 N.E. 288, 291 (1927)
(real estate); Clark v. Clark, 202 Ind. 104, 111, 172 N.E. 124,
126 (1930) (trust fund); Geary v. Geary, 272 N.Y. 390, 398, 6
N.E. (2d) 67, 70 (1936) (retirement or pension fund); Reed v.
Reed, 121 Ohio St. 188, 167 N.E. 684, 687 (1929) (real estate).
Illustrations of other methods are: service of process upon trustees
of defendant's funds, Clark v. Clark, 202 Ind. 104, 111, 172 N.E.
124, 126 (1930); general prayer for relief, Twing v. O'Meara, 59
Iowa 326, 331, 13 N.W. 321, 323 (1882); descriptioin of property
in petition and prayer for vindication through same, Reed v.
Reed, 121 Ohio St. 188, 167 N.E. 684, 687 (1929); preliminary injunction, Benner v. Benner, 63 Ohio St. 220, 58 N.E. 569, 571
(1900). On the general subject matter see Notes (1924) 29 A.L.R.
1381, (1928) 64 A.L.R. 1392, (1937) 108 A.L.R. 1302.
The word "property" has no definite or stable connotation. Sometimes it is employed to indicate the physical object to which various
legal rights, privileges, etc. relate; then again with greater discrimination it is used to denote the legal interest (or aggregate of
legal relations) appertaining to such physical object. Hohfeld,
"Fundamental Legal Conceptions" (1923) 28. The court in the
principal case founded its jurisdiction on a man's property in his
labor, but relied on cases involving the protection of the right to
labor and exemplifying loose usage by designating labor as the
highest form of property. See n. 1 supra; cf. Gleason v. Thaw,
185 Fed. 345, 347 (C.C.A. 3d, 1911). The word "property" is a very
general term and its meaning should be restricted by the more
specific words with which it is associated and by the purpose
for which it is used.
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9
is such as to support a "decree in rem". In a creditor's suit the defendant's salary can be reached only to the amount accrued at commencement of the action.' 0 Such earnings are not subject to a suit
in aid of execution or to process of a court of equity because defendant has neither legal nor equitable title thereto."' Thus, under facts
similar to the instant case, it was held that, since future earnings cannot be reached by a suit in equity, it would be an anomoly to allow
sequestration of earnings accruing subsequent to appointment of a receiver. 12 The court distinguished sequestratioh of future income from
a trust or pension fund on the ground that such income would be subject
to a judgment creditor's suit.1s Also in such cases the right to the
income was vested in the defendant when sequestration was sought.
But in the salary case an agreement, though prescribing rate of payment in writing, does not of itself give a right to receive the salary.
Such salary, if given, is only payment for services to be rendered.14
Neither reason nor precedent support the instant case. The state's
interest in the marriage contract' 5 and its responsibility upon divorce

9.

10.

11.
12.
13.
14.

15.

In terms of the Hohfeldion analysis, a right in rem, or multital
right, correctly understood is simply one of a large number of
fundamentall similar rigghts residing in one person; and any one
of such rights has as its correlative one and only one, of a large
number of general, or common duties-that is, fundamentally similar
duties residing respectively in many different persons. A right
in personam is one having few if any "companion rights", whereas
a right in rem always has many such "companions". All rights in
rem are against persons. The intrinsic nature of substantive primary rights, whether they be rights in rem or rights in personam,
is not dependent on character of proceedings by which they may
be vindicated. A primary right in personam, e.g., A's right that
B pay $1000 may frequently be vindicated only by an attachment
proceeding, one quasi in rem. Hohfeld, "Fundamental Legal Conceptions" (1923) 76, 77, 95, 110, 114; cf. Cook, "Powers of Courts
of Equity" (1915) 15 Col. L. Rev. 37, 106.
McGrew v. McGrew, 38 F. (2d) 541, 544 (App. D.C. 1930), cert.
denied, 50 Sup. Ct. 349 (1930); State ex rel. Busby v. Cowan, 232
Mo. App. 391, 394, 107 S.W. (2d) 805, 807 (1937); Browning v.
Bettis and Garrow, 8 Paige 568 (N.Y. 1841); Valentine v. Williams, 159 N.Y. Supp. 815 (1916); Note (1937) 106 A.L.R. 588.
See n. 10 supra.
Tompers v. Tompers, 159 N.Y. Supp. 817 (1916), appeal denied,
159 N.Y. Supp. 1146.
Zwingmann v. Zwingmann, 150 App. Div. 358, 134 N.Y. Supp.
1077 (2d Dep't 1912) (pension fund); Moore v. Moore, 143 App.
Div. 428, 128 N.Y. Supp. 259 (1st Dep't 1911) (trust case).
Tompers v. Tompers, 159 N.Y. Supp. 817 (1916), appeal denied,
159 N.Y. Supp. 1146; cf. Bruton v. Tearle, 7 Cal. (2d) 48, 53, 59 P.
(2d) 953, 955 (1936), where the court emphasizing that means of
enforcing an alimony judgment are different and more effective
than those applicable to an ordinary money judgment, appointed a
receiver of the future earnings of the husband. See criticism Note
(1937) 106 A.L.R. 588. The case is distinguishable from the present
decision where future earnings are the basis for the court's jurisdiction.
People v. Case, 241 III. 279, 284, 89 N.E. 638, 640 (1909); Jarrard
v. Jarrard, 116 Wash. 70, 198 Pac. 741, 742 (1921).
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to provide for the support and custody of children is well recognized;4
yet "public policy" alone is not a sufficient justification for the decision
Since divorce law is statutory,17 legislative authority for the procedure
followed would be preferable.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
CHANGE IN INTERPRETATION AFTER REENACTMENT
In an aplication for naturalization, a native of Canada, a Seventh
Day Adventist, refused to promise to bear arms in defense of thif
country on the basis that the promise would be contrary to his religious belief. He was willing to do military service as a non-combatan
and was willing to take the oath of allegiance as required of alienE
by the Nationality Act of 1940,1 which does not specifically require
that petitioners for citizenship must promise to bear arms. Held:
The District Court's order admitting the applicant to citizenship was
affirmed.2 Girouard v. United States, 66 S. Ct. 826 (1946).3
The question presented is one of statutory construction. Does the
statute require an applicant for citizenship to state under oath that
he is willing to take up arms in defense of his country? A divided
court, interpreting the Naturalization Act of 1906, 4 held in the
Schwimmer, 5 Macintosh,6 and BlandT cases that it was an implied
requirement8 The decisions met with prolific adverse criticism.9 For
16. Kelley v. Kelley, 317 Ill. 104, 110, 147 N.E. 659, 661 (1925); Hickey
v. Thayer, 85 Kan. 556, 118 Pac. 56, 57 (1911), 41 L.R.A. (N.S.)
564 (1913).
17. Barrington v. Barrington, 206 Ala. 192, 89 So. 512, 513 (1921);
Sweigart v. State, 213 Ind. 157, 167, 12 N.E. (2d) 134, 138 (1938).
E.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. (1945) c. 40, § 1-21.
1. 54 Stat. 1137, 1157, 8 U.S.C.A. § 735 (b) (1940).
2. The decision of the District Court of Massachusetts, admitting
him to citizenship was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals,
U.S. v. Girouard, 149 F. (2d) 760 (C.A.A. 1st, 1945). The Circuit Court took its action on the authority of U.S. v. Schwimmer,
279 U.S. 644 (1929); U.S. v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931);
U.S. v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931).
As a matter of statutory construction, the Court held that
Congress did not intend to require a promise to bear arms as a
prerequisite to citizenship, and that judicial interpretation rendered prior to legislative re-enactment of the Naturalization Act
did not preclude judicial review of previous Supreme Court decisions.
3. Stone, C. J., Frankfurter and Reed, J. J., dissenting.
4. 34 Stat. 596 (1906).
5. U.S. v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929).
6. U.S. v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
7. U.S. v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931).
8. The Court in the principal case has adopted the dissenting opinion
of Hughes, C.J., in U.S. v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 635 (1931),
1... while recognizing the power of Congress, the mere holding
of religious or conscientious scruples against all wars should not
disqualify a citizen from holding office in this country, or an applicant otherwise qualified from being admitted to citizenship. ..
9. Fields, "Conflicts in Naturalization Decisions" (1936) 10 Temp.

